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The IEEE 802.21 framework for Media Independent Handover (MIH) provides seamless vertical handover support for multimode
mobile terminals. MIH messages are exchanged over various wireless media between mobile terminals and access networks to
facilitate seamless handover. This calls for the need to secure MIH messages against network security threats in the wireless
medium. In this paper, we first analyze IPSec/IKEv2 and DTLS security solution for secure MIH message transport. We show
that handover latency can be an impediment to the use of IPSec and DTLS solutions. To overcome the handover overhead and
hence minimize authentication time, a new secure MIH message transport solution, referred as MIHSec in this paper, is proposed.
Experimental results are obtained for MIH between WLAN and Ethernet networks and the impacts of MIH message security on
the handover latency are evaluated for IPSec, DTLS, and MIHSec security solutions. The eﬀectiveness of MIHSec is demonstrated.
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1. Introduction
Modern access systems have the capability to fulfill a specific
quality-of-service (QoS) to the user, which leads to a require-
ment for seamless transitions from one access network
to another in the presence of terminal mobility. Thus, it
is anticipated that seamless interradio access technology
(inter-RAT) mobility will be widely deployed in modern
heterogeneous networks such as IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM), code-division
multiple access (CDMA), and Mobile WiMAX. The growing
importance of these issues has attracted the attention of
standard groups including the IEEE 802.21 work group. The
IEEE 802.21 standard defines Media Independent Handover
(MIH) mechanisms that enable the optimization of inter-
RAT handovers in heterogeneous networks [1–4].
The emerging IEEE 802.21 standard enables seamless,
inter-RAT handover between IEEE 802 and non-IEEE 802
(e.g., 3GPP, 3GPP2) access technologies with the MIH
function (MIHF) in the terminal and network sides. The role
of MIHF is to provide media independent services to multi-
RAT mobile terminals (MMTs) through a common interface
to the mobility management and handover processes.
Related to this work, handover provisioning between
GPRS and WiMAX is suggested in [2], which utilizes the
potential of IEEE 802.21 to eﬃciently support inter-RAT
handovers with full description of MIH services such as
information service for providing network information,
event service to trigger layer 2 (L2) events, and command
service for handover execution like resource reservation
and handover request. Reducing the authentication time
over heterogeneous access networks involving interdomain
mobility is a very critical criterion for seamless handover. In
[3], Media independent preauthentication (MPA) provision
is suggested. MPA provides a significant reduction in
handover delays for both network-layer and application-
layer mobility management protocols. However, the MPA
scheme [3] does not address secure transport of media
independent messages.
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In addition to authentication as described in MPA [3],
confidentiality and message integrity of MIH messages is
another necessary requirement.
The requirements for MIH message level security are
described in the 802.21 Security Study Group proposals [4].
The following security issues are identified.
(i) MIH Access Control. MIH service access should be
controlled based on authentication and authoriza-
tion.
(ii) Replay Protection. An MIH packet for an event or
command can be replayed later to the same node.
(iii) Denial of Service.
(iv) Message Integrity. An MIH message may be altered on
the way.
The available solutions for supporting authentication
and access security are IP Security (IPSec) [5] and Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [6]. IPSec is a security
solution at the network layer and is commonly used for
most Internet applications. DTLS is a security solution
at the transport layer, used for applications that operate
over the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP). In contrast to these existing security
solutions, an MIH Security (MIHSec) solution is proposed
and analyzed in this paper. Unlike IPSec and DTLS, MIHSec
operates at the application layer.
The following MIH message protection issues are consid-
ered in this paper:
(i) communications between MIHF in MMT and any
MIH Points of Service (PoS) in the access network,
(ii) communications between MIHF in MMT and MIH
Information Server,
(iii) communications between MIHF in MMT and MIH
IWF Broker. IWF provides the proprietary function
between MIH services and a specific access network,
(iv) communications between MIHF in access routers
(ARs).
In this paper, we first analyze IPSec with Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) and DTLS security solutions
for secure MIH message transport. We show that handover
latency is an impediment to the use of IPSec and DTLS
solutions. To overcome the handover overhead and hence
minimize authentication time, a new secure MIH message
transport solution, referred as MIHSec in this paper, is
proposed.
IPSec and DTLS are oﬀ the shelf security solutions
and software for them is readily available as GNU source.
However, MIHSec is a newly defined security solution for
providing security to MIH Messages. MIHSec operates at
the application layer and utilizes Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) and MIH header TLV extensions to provide
security to MIH messages.
Prototypes of MIH security methods with IPSEc/IKEv2,
DTLS, and the new MIHSec mechanism are developed and
the results are compared based on IEEE 802.21 Draft 11 for
handover scenarios between Wi-Fi and Ethernet networks.
The impacts on signaling latency, message transport latency,
message overhead, and configurations are analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provide background information on the IEEE 802.21
standard. In Section 3, we define the secure MIH transport
models. In Section 4, the feasible methods for secure MIH
transport with existing solutions such as IPSec/IKE and
DTLS are analyzed. In Section 5, we present the design
of our new secure MIH message transport protocol called
MIHSec. In Sections 6 and 7, we exemplify the prototype
by implementing and testing with MIHF implementation
between Wi-Fi and Ethernet networks. Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1. IEEE 802.21 Standard. IEEE 802.21 [1] is a recent eﬀort
of IEEE that aims at enabling seamless service continuity
among heterogeneous networks including 3GPP, 3GPP2, and
the IEEE 802 family of standards. The standard defines a
logical entity, MIHF, which is located between the lower
layer (L2 and below) and upper layer. At the lower layer,
MMT has multiple radio interfaces for diﬀerent access
technologies such as WLAN, WiMAX, and 3GPP. Upper
layer entities that use the services provided by MIHF are
referred as MIH Users. The role of MIHF is providing media
independent services to MIH Users through a common
interface to facilitate mobility management and handover
processes.
Figure 1 shows the overview of MIH framework outlined
by IEEE 802.21 standard. There are three primary services:
Media Independent Event Service (MIES), Media Indepen-
dent Command Service (MICS), and Media Independent
Information Service (MIIS). MIES may indicate or predict
changes in a state and transmission behavior of the physical
and link layers. Common MIES provided through MIHF
are “Link Up,” “Link Down,” “Link Parameters Change,”
and “Link Going Down.” MICS enables higher layers to
configure, control, and obtain information from the lower
layers including physical and link layers. The information
provided by MICS is dynamic information comprised of
link parameters, whereas information provided by MIIS is
comprised of static parameters.
MIIS provides a unified framework for obtaining neigh-
boring network information that exists within a geographical
area. It helps the higher layer mobility protocol to acquire a
global view of available heterogeneous networks to conduct
eﬀective seamless handover. The information may be present
in MMT locally but is usually stored in some external
information server, which may be accessed by the MIHF
in the MMT. For MIIS, the IEEE 802.21 standard defines
information structures called Information Elements (IEs)
that are classified into two groups: access network specific
information (type of network, roaming agreements, cost of
connecting, and QoS capabilities) and Point of Attachment
(PoA) specific information (channel range, location, and
supported data rates).














































Figure 2: Network model with MIH services.
Figure 2 shows an example of the network model
including MIH services. An MIH-capable MMT has multiple
wireless interfaces based on diﬀerent access technologies.
It can connect concurrently to multiple PoAs, which are
network side endpoints of L2 links. Each access network
provides one or more MIH PoS nodes. To provide MIIS, an
MIIS server can be located on the network side. The server
maintains information of neighboring access networks in its
local database.
Figure 3 shows the MIH-based handover message
exchange involved in a mobile initiated handover from
the serving network to the target network. The detailed
explanation of the messages and procedures are as follows.
The MIH procedure starts with the MMT querying about
the surrounding networks. This query is forwarded by the
information server located in the operator network and
answered to MMT with available candidate network infor-
mation (message 1-2). As the answer contains information
regarding a possible network, the MMT switches on its
target network interface and starts to measure the candidate
networks. Just after measuring the candidate network, MMT
will generate an MIH MN Candidate Query message asking
for the list of resources available in candidate networks and
including the QoS requirements of the user (message 3–6).
At this point, the MMT has enough information about
the surrounding networks to decide on the network to
which it will hand over. Once the MMT has decided the
target network to hand over, it delivers a handover commit
command to the MIHF (message 7–10), which will be
used for resource reservation in the target network before
switching from the serving network to the target network (L2
and L3 handover). After completion of resource reservation
in the target network, the MMT starts to establish the
connection in the target network. Once the connection is
established, a higher-layer handover procedure can start. In
this case Mobile IP has been selected, although any other
mobility management protocol would be equally suited.
When the handover is completed at the higher layers, the
MMT sends an MIH HO Complete message to the MIHF,
which will inform the target PoS that it is now the new
serving PoS. At this point the target PoS informs all the
involved network elements of the handover finalization
(message 11–14). Specifically, the target PoS has to inform
the serving PoS of the handover completion so that it can
release any resources.
2.2. Existing Secure Transport Methods. IP Security [5] and
DTLS [6] are the existing secure transport methods currently
available in the market, which support authentication and
access security for the MIH messages. Figure 4 shows the
integration of the security framework in the existing MIH
framework.
2.2.1. IPSec/IKEv2. IPSec [5] provides a standard mecha-
nism for data security for protocols running over IP. Since the
MIH messages (in the prototype implementation of MIHF)
use UDP over IPv6 for transport, IPSec can be an automatic
choice for message protection. However, since IPSec needs a
preconfigured trust relationship between the communicating
end points, the feasibility and eﬃciency of this method needs
to be examined in the context of handover to diﬀerent access
networks.
Figure 5 shows the messages exchanged between MIH
enabled nodes, to setup the IPSec tunnel using IKEv2.
2.2.2. Datagram Transport Layer Security. The DTLS [6]
protocol provides communication privacy for datagram
protocols. It is designed to run in the application space,
without requiring any kernel modifications. The basic design
philosophy of DTLS is to construct “TLS over datagram.”
The reason that TLS cannot be used directly in datagram
environments is simply that packets may be lost or reordered.
TLS has no internal facilities to handle this kind of unrelia-
bility, and therefore TLS can break when hosted on datagram
transport. The purpose of DTLS is to make only the minimal
changes to TLS required to fix this problem. To the greatest
extent possible, DTLS is identical to TLS.
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Figure 3: MIH-based handover—call flow.
Figure 6 shows the DTLS protocol messages exchanged
between client and server for establishing a DTLS associa-
tion.
2.2.3. New MIHSec Transport Method. In the above section,
the current secure transport methods like IPSec and DTLS
are discussed. In contrast to these two methods, a new
method known as MIHSec is proposed in this paper. MIHSec
provides solutions to the problems that arise in using
IPSec and DTLS for MIH-based handover applications. The
details of the problems and solutions are presented in the
subsequent sections.
3. Secure MIH Transport Models
This paper discusses two secure transport models that are
commonly used in general security architectures [7] like
IPSec.
The end-to-end security model provides protection to
the messages on an end-to-end basis; that is, packets
encrypted at source is decrypted at the end point. And the
other model is the end point-to-security gateway model,
wherein packets are encrypted between the endpoint and
the gateway, which is to say that the packets should be
encrypted/decrypted multiple times on its transmission to
the destination node. Elaborate descriptions of these two
models, when applied to the MIH solution, are given in the
subsequent paragraphs.
3.1. End-to-End Protection. In this model, a secure channel
is established from the MMT to each MIH service end-point
in the network, before any MIH message exchange can take
place. The secure channel source is MMT and the destination
is Interworking Function (IWF), MIH Information Service
(IS) server, and PoS. IWF provides the proprietary function
between MIH services and a specific access network. This is
out of the scope of IEEE 802.21.
The secured path shall provide data integrity, authentic-
ity, and confidentiality as desired. The MIH on MMT will
be responsible for setting up and terminating the secure
channel. An encrypted packet sent from MMT can be
decrypted at IWF, IS server, and PoS only. Other than the
































Figure 4: Secure transport module in MIH framework.
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Figure 5: IPSec tunnel establishment.
destination node, the nodes on the path cannot decrypt the
packet. This model provides security between the nodes that
are residing in the end point of the transmission paths.
For example, during handover to a new access network,
the MIH entity in MMT should trigger the IKEv2 daemon
to establish an IPSec security association (SA) with MIH PoS
for MIH command and event service in the new access net-
work, before sending the MIH-MN-HO-Complete message.
It should also establish IPSec SA with the MIH IS server
in the same way, before sending any MIH Get Information
request message to the IS server. Similarly, a secure channel
has to be established between MMT and IWF Proxy before
transmitting any packet between the MMT and IWF Proxy
nodes. The tunnel between MMT and AR is identified as T2,
the tunnel between MMT and IWF Proxy is identified as T1,
and the tunnel between MMT and IS server is identified as
T3. This is illustrated in Figure 7.
3.2. Endpoint-to-Security Gateway Protection. In this model,
a secure channel is established from the MMT to the AR
in the access network, before any MIH message exchange
Client hello
Hello verify request
Client hello with cookie
Rest of handshake
MN MIHF Serving PoS MIHF
Figure 6: DTLS client server message exchange.














Figure 7: MIH message security through end-to-end tunnels.
can take place between MMT and AR. The source is the
MMT and the destination is AR. And similarly when the
packet is sent from AR, the source is AR and the destination
is the MMT. The secured path shall provide data integrity,
authenticity, and confidentiality as desired. The MIH on
MMT will be responsible for setting up and terminating the
secure channel with the AR. The AR will be responsible for
establishing a secure channel between itself and each MIH
node in the network, like IWF Proxy or IS server.
For example, during handover to a new access network,
the MIH entity in MMT should trigger the IKEv2 daemon
to establish an IPSec SA with the new AR, before sending the
MIH MN HO Complete Message. Establishment of a secure
channel is done before transmitting any MIH packet.
In this method, the destination end point may or may not
be the logical end point of the tunnel. For example, when
MMT sends an MIH Get Information request message to
the IS server, the packet traverses through tunnel T1 and
tunnel T3 to reach the destination—IS server. As shown in
Figure 8, the tunnel between MMT and AR is known as T1,
the tunnel between AR and IS server is T3, and the tunnel
between AR and IWF Proxy is T2.
The analysis in this paper focuses on security through
end-to-end tunnels, as illustrated in Figure 7, and the
experimental results are based on that model only. However,
similar results are expected in the endpoint to gateway tunnel
method also, as illustrated in Figure 8.
The endpoint to gateway approach would have an
advantage when it is assumed that the secure channel T1 is
not required as this path will be protected by L2 security. In
such a case the overhead of security will be avoided in the
wireless link.














Figure 8: MIH message security through endpoint to gateway
tunnels.
Hence in this paper, the endpoint to endpoint tunnel
method is considered.
4. Analysis of Secure MIH Message Transport
with Existing Solutions
4.1. Requirement of Secure MIH Message Transport. The
MIH-enabled nodes in the network have the capability to
handle the Event Service (ES), Command Service (CS), and
Information Service (IS) requests. These service messages
carry manifold information, which is helpful to the decision
process in MIHF to perform the handover functionality in
the network and node elements.
The MIH messages are transmitted over the Internet
between the MIH enabled access node, the IS server, and IWF
proxy. For MMTs these messages are sent over the wireless
network and the wired infrastructure that make up the access
domain.
As an MIH message is transmitted over insecure channels
on its path to the destination, it becomes an obligation to
secure these messages from hackers who are trying to hijack
the channels, spoof the packets, or snoop in the network.
This section discusses the list of security features that are
required to be incorporated in the MIH messages.
4.1.1. MIH Access Control. Based on policies, an MIH PoS in
the operator network may want to allow only certain MIH
services to the MIH entity in the MMT. The access control
can be enforced through IPSec/IKEv2, DTLS or by defining
new information elements as a part of the MIH protocol.
4.1.2. MIH Replay Protection and Denial of Service. MIH
packets may be spoofed or packets may be replayed by an
attacker. By using IPSec SA or DTLS session for all MIH
message exchanges, these attacks can be prevented. An MIH
protocol level method may also be considered for protection
against this attack by including timestamp/sequence number
in the MIH messages.
4.1.3. MIH Data Integrity and Confidentiality. MIH data
integrity and confidentiality can be achieved through IPSec
and DTLS. A suﬃciently strong encryption and integrity
algorithm, for example, aes-cbc/256-bit and hmac-sha1/
128-bit, can be negotiated between MIH peers during IKEv2
[8] signaling or DTLS handshake to ensure protection.
An MIH protocol-based approach can be used for
message integrity. For example, a message authentication
code information element may be included in each MIH
message, which needs to be protected for data integrity.
All three methods for MIH message protection are ana-
lyzed in this paper to identify the scope of prototyping and
experimentation. Based on the prototyping and experimen-
tation results, the IPSec, DTLS, and new MIHSec methods
will be evaluated for ease of configuration, eﬃciency, and
handover latency.
4.2. Methods of Securing MIH Message Transport with
Existing Solutions
4.2.1. IPSec/IKEv2. In Figure 9, MIHF will trigger the IKEv2
daemon to establish an IPSec SA with the MIH endpoint
before any MIH message exchange can take place.
Each MIH end-point shall perform the following steps:
(1) get X.509 Certificate from a trusted certificate author-
ity (CA) by supplying the MIHF ID,
(2) install the CA certificate and the host certificate,
(3) exchange the credentials with the other MIHF end
point and verify the other end-point’s certificate and
MIHF ID,
(4) update the IPSec policy database (SPD) and IPSec
association database (SAD) for protection of MIH
Message (UDP/MIH PORT) sent to and received
from the other MIH endpoint.
The credentials are exchanged and verified by the IKEv2
daemon in IKE SA INIT and IKE SA AUTH. This method
requires that the MIHF endpoints know the MIHF ID of the
other MIH end point. How the MIHF IDs of MIH PoS in the
target network are obtained is the topic of “MIHF Discovery
Analysis”. Table 1 lists various scenarios in this regard and the
possible ways to get the MIHF ID.
(a) IPSec/IKEv2 Pros and Cons.
Pros has the following.
(1) IPSec provides the most standard solution for data
security for protocols running over IP. Even the IP
header can be protected by using IPSec in tunnel
mode.
(2) IPSec support is readily available in all standard
operating systems.
(3) Using IKEv2, security keys can be configured auto-
matically.
(4) Using IKEv2 with EAP allows the security credentials
to be verified by the authentication, authorization,
and accounting (AAA) server for the access network.
Cons has the following.
(1) IKEv2 signaling adds to latency in handover.
(2) IPSec header adds overhead to packets send over the
air interface.
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Figure 9: Securing MIH with IPSec.
(3) IPSec ciphering algorithm execution adds to latency
in handover.
(4) Integration of MIH with IKE is an issue with
handover as IP address changes in MMT.
4.2.2. DatagramTransport Layer Security. In Figure 10, DTLS
is used for secure MIH transport, which uses all of the same
handshake messages and flows as TLS, with three principal
changes:
(1) a stateless cookie exchange has been added to prevent
denial of service attacks,
(2) modifications to the handshake header to handle
message loss, reordering, and fragmentation,
(3) retransmission timers to handle message loss.
(a) DTLS Pros and Cons.
Pros has the following.
(1) DTLS is an application layer protocol.
(2) No kernel modification is required.
(3) It does not depend on any underlying reliable
transport protocol.
(4) It can be implemented with lesser modification of
existing TLS.
(5) It is closer to functionalities of IPSec but cheaper.
Cons has the following.
(1) DTLS signaling which involves multiple handshake
messages between client and server adds to latency.
(2) DTLS is not independent protocol. DTLS will inter-
nally use TLS library. So TLS library support is
required.
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Figure 10: Securing MIH with DTLS.
Table 1: Methods for getting MIHF ID’s.
MIHF Host Scenario Solution
MIHF on MMT To get PAR MIHF ID during start up
MIHF Discovery methods. Listen to MIHF Capability
Discover Broadcast
MIHF on MMT To get NAR MIHF ID during HO
MIHF Discovery methods (DHCP/DNS). Listen to
MIHF Capability Discover Broadcast
MIHF on MMT To get IS server MIHF ID MIHF Discovery methods (DHCP/DNS)
MIHF on PAR To get NAR MIHF ID Listen to MIHF Capability Discover Broadcast
MIHF on PAR To get IS server MIHF ID MIHF Discovery methods (DHCP/DNS)
5. Method for Securing MIH Messages with
Protocol Extensions to MIH (MIHSec)
5.1. Motivation for a New Secure MIH Messages Transport
Protocol. In the previous sections we discussed IPSec and
DTLS solution to provide security to the MIH messages. The
IPSec operates at IP layer and the DTLS at the application
layer to provide security to the MIH messages.
The IPSec and DTLS could suﬃce the requirements for
providing security to the MIH messages. The steps carried
out to provide secure transmission of MIH messages are
provided in Figure 11.
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L2 authentication and MSK
generation
The authentication could
be through IKE or DTLS
Authentication for MIH transport
Key generation for MIH transport
Packet transmission on secure channel
Access routerMMT IS server
Figure 11: IPSec/DTLS key generations at IS server.
The L2 authentication is performed between the MMT
and AR. This provides a secure communication channel on
the air interface between MMT and AR.
The MIH Transport Authentication—which can be
IKEv2 or DTLS—is carried out next to authenticate MMT
with the MIH network entity. In Figure 11, IS server is
considered as an MIH entity, for example, illustration. Upon
completion of the authentication with the IS server, the MIH
IK and the CK keys are generated. These keys are used by
the MIH layer to provide the secure communication channel
between the MMT and IS server.
The inherent problem with IPSec/DTLS security method
is multiple authentications (L2 authentication and Authen-
tication for MIH Transport) that occur in the flow. The
additional MIH transport authentication would add to the
latency during the handover, which in turn degrades the per-
formance of handover. If MIH transport authentication can
be eliminated, the handover latency time will be minimized.
This section discusses basic idea to provide the MIH Security
at the application layer by providing enhancements to the
802.21 standard.
5.2. Enhancements to 802.21 to Support MIH Security
(MIHSec)
5.2.1. The Concept of MIHSec. The inherent disadvantages of
DTLS and IPSec in the handover scenarios would support the
need for developing a new integrated security feature in MIH
messages. The important requirement is minimization of
handover latency and support of confidentiality and integrity
protection to the MIH messages.
The idea here is to eliminate the MIH transport authen-
tication and utilize the Master Shared Key generated by the
L2 authentication procedure, for generating the MIH keys.
Avoiding MIH transport authentication step would enhance
the handover latency and hence better performance during
the handover as shown in Figure 12.
The solution that is proposed here would utilize the
authentication provided at the L2 layer. In most of the access
networks, available in today’s market, the authentication is
provided by using the EAP standard.
L2 auth and MSK generation
Utilize MSK from L2
authentication in MIH
transport key generation
Key generation for MIH transport
Packet transmission on secure channel
Access routerMMT IS server






















Figure 13: Generation of peer-key.
MIH protocol would utilize the MSK generated by the
EAP, to generate its own CK and IK. The advantage of
using MSK of L2 authentication is (a) low latency and (b)
maintenance of key hierarchy—in security parlance, its also
known as perfect forward secrecy.
Upon completion of L2 authentication, MSK is sent to
AR in the Access Network. The AR sends the MSK and MAC
address of the MMT to the IS server.
The MSK is utilized by MIHF in AR to generate a Peer-
Key in MIHF node in AR. And also the MSK is utilized by
MIHF in IS server to generate IS-Key.
To summarize, between the MMT and AR nodes, Peer-
Key is generated and between MMT and IS server nodes IS-
Key is generated. Peer-Key is the key hierarchy between MMT
and AR and IS-Key is the key hierarchy between MMT and
IS server.
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5.2.2. MIH Key Generation Procedure. In Figure 13, the
multimode mobile terminal performs authentication with
the access network. This is done using the EAP protocol. The
result of the authentication is the generation of the MSK key.
The peer MIH function in AR uses the MSK key, along with
other parameters to generate a Peer-Key. The algorithm for
generating the keys is described in the following section.
(a) Algorithm for Security Keys Generation between Mobile
Terminal and PoA. The Peer-Key is used to establish secure
channel between MMT and PoA. The pseudocode for
generating the security keys is described as follows:
Algorithm 1. Key generation algorithm in MIHPeer().
Begin:
Get the MSK key of EAP
Use the keyed-md5 as Pseudo Random Function
for generating the Peer-Key
Peer-Key = Keyed-md5(MSK, MAC-Peer, MAC-
PoA)
// The inputs to the prf are MAC address of MMT
and MAC address of PoA
The result of keyed-md5 is Peer-Key
Peer-Key is a 128 bit hash value
Use Peer-Key to generate the CK and IK
Cipher Key = prf(Peer-Key, “Peer”, 0)
Integrity Key = prf(Peer-Key, “Peer”, 1)
// The 0 and 1 in the prf function indicate whether
the key generated is the CK or the IK
End:
CK(Ciphering Key) and IK(Integrity Key) generated are
used to secure the MIH Data, along with the MIH headers
(b) Algorithm for Generating Security Keys between MMT
and IS Server. IS-Key is used to establish secure channel
between the mobile terminal and the IS server. The algorithm
for generating security keys between IS server and MMT is
mentioned here in after.
The pseudo code for generating security keys is described
as follows:
Algorithm 2. Key generation algorithm in MIHServer().
Begin:
Get the MSK key of EAP
Use the keyed-md5 as Pseudo Random Function
for generating the Peer-Key
IS-Key = Keyed-md5(MSK, ISServer-IPAddress,
MAC-Peer)
// The inputs to the prf are IP Address of the IS
server and MAC address of MMT
The result of keyed-md5 is IS-Key
Peer-Key is a 128 bit hash value
Use IS-Key to generate the CK and IKs between the
MMT and the IS server
Cipher Key = prf(IS-Key, “IS-Server”, 0)
Integrity Key = prf(IS-Key, “IS-Server”, 1)
// The 0 and 1 in the prf function indicate
whether the key generated is the CK or the IK
End:
5.2.3. Extensions to MIH Header. IP Security operates at
IP layer. An extension to the IP header has been provided
to incorporate security features in IP. Similarly there is a
need to provide security extension headers to the current
MIH standard for providing security features in 802.21. The
objective of these extension headers is to carry message digest
between tunnel end points, to enable the end points to
validate the packet data and header information.
In order to support security at the MIH, extensions need
to be provided at MIH Header as illustrated in Figure 14.
This is due to the fact that the MIH layer at the destination
has to identify if the MIH packet is security protected or
not. Hence, two new TLVs are added to support the security
feature in MIH. An encryption TLV and integrity TLV are
provided as an extension for MIHSec. The illustration of the
same is provided in Figure 11.
And as illustrated in Figure 15, encryption is provided
over MIH data and confidentiality is provided over MIH
header and MIH data.
When a secure MIH packet is to be transmitted from
MMT to IS server, MIHF in MMT performs confidentiality
protection first and then applies integrity protection on
header and data. At the destination node, the MIHF in the
IS server performs integrity checking initially and if the
integrity check is passed, confidentiality check is done. If
either of integrity check or the confidentiality check fails, that
packet is dropped.
Integrity protection checking is done first, before per-
forming the deciphering functionality.
5.2.4. Benefits of MIH Security Solution.
(i) A separate authentication mechanism (like IKE
authentication or DTLS authentication) is not nec-
essary as the MSK keys from the L2 authentication
are utilized in maintaining key hierarchy and also for
generating the MIH CK and IK keys.
(ii) The handover latency is minimized due to elimina-
tion of IKE/DTLS authentication procedure.
(iii) Changes to the MIH code are minimal to support
confidentiality and integrity protection and hence the
ease of integration with the present code.
(iv) Available PRF algorithms can be reused.
(v) The last one is the protection against Denial of
Service.
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MIH-type (confidentiality/integrity) MIH value (128 bit cipher or 128 bit hash)MIH length










MIH data MIH header
MIH fixed header MIH TLV header
MIH integrity header MIH confidentiality header
MIH header with security TLVs
Figure 15: MIH with security TLV.
5.3. Performance Evaluation Parameters
5.3.1. Security Signaling Latency. Security signaling latency
is defined as time taken to perform the authentication and
security key generation, along with the tunnel establishment
time:
Security Signaling Latency = Authentication Time
+ Key generation Time
+ Tunnel Establishment Time.
(1)
The authentication time is the time taken to authenticate
the MIHF-enabled network entity. Key generation time is the
time taken to generate the CK and IK keys from the MSK.
Tunnel establishment time is the time taken to populate the
IKs, CKs, and MIHF entity MAC address information in the
table.
5.3.2. Message Transport Latency. Message transport latency
is defined as the time taken to apply the integrity protection
or confidentiality protection on the MIH packet that is
exchanged between the MIHF entities:
Message Transport Latency
= Time taken to apply protection to MIH packet.
(2)
5.3.3. Message Overhead. Message overhead is the amount of
additional information that has to be carried in the MIH
packet to carry the message digest. The message digest is
















Figure 16: System software architecture in MMT and AR with
MIHF and IPSec entities.
6. Prototype Implementation
6.1. Software Architecture for IPSec/IKEv2. Figure 16 shows
system software architecture in MMT and AR with MIHF
and IPSec functions integrated. The following entities are
added to the MIHF/VHO-Client implementation.
Security Configuration Settings. MIHF shall be configured
manually to use appropriate security methods (IPSec-
IKEv1/v2, encryption/authentication algorithms, etc.).
MIHF Security Manager. The MIHF security manager mod-
ule shall read the security settings from the configuration file.
It will generate the connection settings (/etc/ipsec.d/
mihfsec.conf) dynamically for the new MIHF peer with
which the IPSec SA need to be established, reload the settings
in IKEv2 daemon, and trigger the IKEv2 daemon to establish
IPSec SA with target MIHF peer.
Openssl. The IPSec modules in this solution use the openssl
library version 0.9.8 g [9].
The prototype implementation is tested with diﬀerent
security algorithms for encryption and integrity check to
measure the latency in handover due to IKEv2 signaling
messages as well as MIH message transaction delay added by
the security algorithms.














Figure 17: System software architecture in MMT/AR with MIHF
and DTLS entities.
6.2. Software Architecture for DTLS. Figure 17 shows the
system software architecture in MMT and AR with MIHF
and DTLS functions being integrated. The following entities
are added to the MIHF/VHO Client implementation.
Security Configuration Settings. MIHF shall be configured
manually to use appropriate security methods (DTLS,
encryption/authentication algorithms, etc.).
DTLS. This layer is responsible for enforcing MIH message-
transport security. This module creates a DTLS client socket
for initiating MIH message exchange with MIH peers and
a DTLS server socket which listens to MIHF message from
MIH peers. DTLS connection will be established between the
peer sockets before any MIH exchange can take place.
Secure Socket Layer. This is implemented using openssl
0.9.8 g library
The DTLS client initiates the communication by sending
HELLO SERVER packet by using SSL write API. This
initiates the DTLS handshake message sequence, where the
messages are processed by the Openssl library. The DTLS
client and server authenticate each other, negotiate the
algorithms for encryption and integrity, and install the
security keys.
Asymmetric key cryptography with RSA (Rivest, Shamir,
and Adleman) algorithm is used for authentication between
the peer entities.
The client MIH peer sends the all MIH request messages
through SSL Write API, which results in the message to be
encrypted with the established security key and sent to the
server. The server MIH peer decrypts the data and sends to
the SSL read API for passing the message to the MIHF/VHO-
Client module.
The prototype implementation is tested with diﬀerent
security algorithms for encryption and integrity check to
measure the latency in handover due to DTLS signaling



















Figure 18: Software architecture for MIHSec.
6.3. Software Architecture for MIHSec. Figure 18 shows the
software architecture for MIHSec. An AR example is consid-
ered to elaborate the architecture concepts. The same design
would apply to the MMT also.
MIHF is a media independent handover function. It
operates at application layer and interfaces with UDP layer
in the kernel, VHO application at the user land space. MIHF
handles the event service, command service, and information
service messages.
VHO application interacts with MIHF in AR and
authentication application. The job of VHO application is to
make handover decisions and to maintain the key hierarchy.
The key hierarchy is utilized to generate the CKs and IKs
for the MIH sessions. The IK and CK are maintained in the
table, which is indexed by MAC address of the Peer. The MAC
address of the peer acts as a security parameter index for the
secure channel.
The changes required to VHO application code for
incorporating the MIH security are minimal and hence ease
of integration with the current MIH code for providing
security enhancements.
A brief patch for the MIH security is provided as follows:
Note that the patch is shown in italics font and current
code in regular font.
Vho application main()
Being:
New MMT has made an attach with the AR
Receive MSK from authentication application
Generate Peer Key and IS Key
Generate CK and IK keys from the key hierarchy









MIH LookUp in AR()
Being:
Handle the received packet
Extract MMT-MAC from MIH TLV
Index into the Key Table (Figure 20) based on Peer-
MAC
Extract CK and IK
Perform Integrity Check to the packet
If the integrity check fails, drop the packet
Else perform the Ciphering Check
If the ciphering check fails, drop the packet
Else
. . .




MIH LookUp In MMT()
Being:
Handle the received packet
Extract MMT-MAC and AR-MAC from MIH TLV
Index into the Key Table based on Peer-MAC
Extract CK and IK
Perform Integrity Check to the packet
If the integrity check fails, drop the packet
Else perform the Ciphering Check
If the ciphering check fails, drop the packet
Else
. . .




MIH Secure Packet Transmission()
Being:
Decide on packets to be transmitted
Check the Security YES/NO Flag. If the flag value is
NO, transmit the normal MIH the packet (It implies
that Security is not mandatory) else
Index into the key table using ID as identifier to
retrieve the IK and CK keys











- Strongswan 1.4.7 daemon [10]
- X.509 certificates with RSA (1024-bit private
key)
DTLS
- Openssl 0.9.8g library [11]
- X.509 certificates with RSA (1024-bit private
key)
MIHSec
- EAP Protocol for Authentication
- Extensions to 802.21 to support MIHSec in
MIHF
(The ID here is MIH Identifier. EAP uses this
identifier in it’s initial messages for identifying itself
with the peer)
Perform Confidentiality protection on MIH Data
Perform Integrity Protection on MIH Data and
MIH
Headers (leaving MIH-Integrity TLV header, but
including MIH-Encryption TLV header)
Transmit the security protected packet
End
The security keys are maintained as shown in Figure 19.
On receiving the MSK from authentication application,
this table is configured by VHO application.
A provision could be provided to configure this table
manually. However, at present, this option is not being
considered and could be investigated later.
7. Experimental Results
7.1. Test Environment. Figure 20 illustrates the test environ-
ment used for testing the prototype implementations with
the test configuration in Table 2.
7.2. Test Settings for Security Methods. The IPSec/IKEv2
connection settings for PAR (and IS server) are statically
configured, while the connection settings for NAR are
dynamically generated.
EAP stack integration with MIHF is performed to enable
EAP to carry MIHF identifier as EAP identifier. MIHF is
extended to support security headers.






















Figure 19: Format of security keys table in AR.




Security signaling latency High (100 s of msec) Moderate (10 s of msec) Low (1 s of msec)
Message transport latency Negligible Negligible Negligible
Configuration and setup Diﬃcult Moderate Easy











Figure 20: Environment for MIH security prototype testing.
7.3. Result Analysis. Test results are analyzed and compared
with respect to Signaling latency, Message transport latency,
Message overhead, Configurations, and setup. The results are
shown in Table 3.
7.3.1. Security Signaling Latency. In the test setup we used,
it is found that IPSec/IKEv2 takes about 230 milliseconds
for IKEv2 signaling involving 2 IKE SA INIT messages and
2 IKE AUTH messages and key generation /installation.
In the DTLS method, only about 30 milliseconds are
taken for signaling and installation of security keys.
In the MIHSec method, since the authentication is
directly integrated with L2 authentication, it leads to an
eﬃcient security signaling time.
7.3.2. Message Transport Latency. Our experimental results
showed that IPSec transforms (Encryption and Decryption)
do not add much confidentiality latency to MIH message
exchange. In this experiment we used general purpose
machines with security algorithms implemented in software.
In more practical scenarios, sophisticated hardware will be
used for implementing security algorithms and then the
latency will be negligible.
Our experimental results showed that DTLS transforms
(Encryption and Decryption) do not add much confidential-
ity latency to MIH message exchange.
The latency of the message transport in MIHSec is
comparable to the IPSec and DTLS latency times.
7.3.3. Message Overhead. To an MIH message exchange
(Request and Response), about 70 bytes are added as over-
head in 3des-cbc/192-bits and about 90 bytes are added as
overhead in the case aes-cbc/256-bit. This is applicable in
both IPSec and MIHSec case.
To an MIH message exchange, about 100 bytes are added
as overhead in the case of DTLS based message protection.
7.3.4. Configuration and Setup. MIHF configuration for
IPSec/IKEv2 is fairly complex. This is due to the fact
that the IKE is inherently a key authentication protocol
with complex configurations, and which expects peer to
configure the security information in advance. In addition
when the handovers are performed, with the changes in IP
address to the mobile terminal, configuration becomes a
challenging task in IPSec/IKEv2. When end-to-end secure
tunnels are used (as in this experimented), the MIHF should
be configured to establish IPSec SA with each end-point.
Manual configuration of this is impractical.
Also the IPSec support is required in the kernel.
DTLS is an Application Layer protocol and the DTLS
Client/Server requires lesser configuration eﬀort.
However, the use of the following approach will simplify
configuration process.
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(1) Use MIH Discovery method for automatically discov-
ering the target MIH endpoint.
(2) Use MIH ID as the unique identifier to generate
X.509.
Configurations that are made for the L2 security should
be suﬃcient for the MIHSec. No additional configurations
are required for MIHSec, hence simplifying configuration
operations when compared to DTLS or IKEv2/IPSec.
8. Conclusion
This paper analyses diﬀerent security methods which could
be used for MIH message protection. Prototype of MIH
security methods with IPSEc/IKEv2, DTLS, and MIHSec
methods are developed and the results are compared. The
experiments showed better results in terms of message
overhead for MIHSec and IPSec methods compared to
DTLS. However in terms of signaling latency, MIHSec
showed better results. Also, since the MIH messages are
transported over UDP (in this implementation of MIHF),
security at transport layer might be suﬃcient, and hence
MIHSec method is a strong candidate. We have presented
numerical results to show that 802.21 with MIHSec security
extensions provides good handover latency, compared to
DTLS and IPSec. This shows that MIHSec is a better solution
to support secure MIH message transport.
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